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Clinical practice relies on patients to make their own treatment decisions, typically in consultation with a clinician. This ap-
proach is intended to respect those who can make 
decisions1 but poses a dilemma for incapacitated 
patients, such as those with advanced Alzheimer 
disease. This dilemma is widespread. In the United 
States, approximately half of all decisions regarding 
life-sustaining treatment for nursing home residents 
and three-quarters of decisions for hospitalized pa-
tients with life-threatening illnesses involve inca-
pacitated patients.2 These situations pose significant 
challenges, especially when it is unclear which treat-
ment the patient prefers, and which treatment best 
promotes the patient’s clinical interests. For example, 
should clinicians intubate a patient with moderate 
Alzheimer disease who has no advance directive and 
develops pneumonia? Current practice in these cases 
is to rely on the patient’s surrogate to make treatment 
decisions in consultation with the patient’s clinicians. 
Patients sometimes designate a surrogate using a du-
rable power of attorney. State statutes identify next-
of-kin surrogates for incapacitated patients who did 
not appoint a surrogate.3
This practice has been in place for more than two 
decades now, yet there have been no systematic eval-
uations of how well it promotes the most important 
ethical goals relevant to making treatment decisions 
for incapacitated patients. In this article, we describe 
these goals and argue, based on empirical data from 
the past twenty years, that in many cases current 
practice systematically fails to promote them. Then 
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we consider various ways to improve 
current practice. We conclude that 
incorporating empirically grounded 
predictions about the individual pa-
tient’s treatment preferences into the 
shared decision-making process of-
fers the greatest potential to promote 
the ethical goals relevant to making 
treatment decisions for incapacitated 
patients.
Six Ethical Goals
Treatment of incapacitated pa-tients sometimes raises concerns 
about how to distribute limited med-
ical resources. The burdens clinicians 
experience also raise questions regard-
ing possible limits to their obligations 
to care for incapacitated patients. 
Recognizing the relevance and impor-
tance of the claims of both clinicians 
and society, the people most affected 
in this context are the patient and the 
patient’s family and loved ones. This 
article focuses on their claims and in-
terests.
Treatment decision-making for 
incapacitated patients should help 
to promote respect for patients’ au-
tonomy and beneficence for patients, 
their families, and their loved ones. 
To realize these ends, decision-mak-
ing should:
1) promote the patient’s clinical 
interests;
2) enable the patient to control 
how he or she is treated;
3) provide treatment consistent 
with the patient’s preferences and 
values;
4) respect the patient’s preferences 
for how treatment decisions are 
made;
5) respect and help the patient’s 
family and loved ones; and 
6) promote timely decision- 
making.
Commentators often focus on 
possible conflicts among these six 
goals. What should be done when 
the patient’s treatment preferences 
conflict with his or her clinical in-
terests? What should be done when 
the patient’s treatment preferences 
conflict with his or her family’s in-
terests? These conflicts raise impor-
tant theoretical questions regarding 
which goals should take priority and 
whether trade-offs can be acceptable. 
But in practice, it is often not clear 
how to realize any of these goals. The 
practically important question, there-
fore, is: To what extent does current 
practice promote the six ethical goals 
for treatment decision-making that 
are attainable in the given situation? 
A significant body of empirical data 
collected over the past twenty years 
provides the opportunity to answer 
this question.
Evaluating Current Practice
Promoting the patient’s clinical 
interests. Current practice works well 
when it is clear which treatment best 
promotes the patient’s clinical inter-
ests, and there is no evidence that 
the patient would not have wanted 
that treatment. There are a signifi-
cant number of cases, however, in 
which the patient’s clinicians are 
unsure which treatment would best 
promote the patient’s clinical inter-
ests. Decisional incapacity arises most 
frequently in the context of severe 
injury, progression of serious disease, 
and dementia. In these cases, it is of-
ten difficult to predict and evaluate 
the outcomes of treatment and weigh 
them against the burden of continued 
care. 
Ideally, these cases would be re-
solved by appeal to a method that 
would help to identify the best course 
of medical treatment. But such a 
method does not exist. If even expert 
clinicians are unsure which treatment 
is best, there is currently no other 
authority on the matter. In a signifi-
cant number of cases, it is therefore 
unclear which course of treatment 
would best promote the patient’s 
clinical interests. In these cases, it is 
unlikely that any method of mak-
ing treatment decisions will be able 
to consistently promote the patient’s 
clinical interests.
Enabling the patient to control 
how he or she is treated. Advance 
directives provide a mechanism by 
which patients can guide the treat-
ments they will receive if they lose the 
ability to make their own decisions.4 
When an incapacitated patient has 
completed a valid advance direc-
tive, and the directive applies to the 
given situation, current practice en-
ables patients to prospectively control 
how they are treated. Unfortunately, 
despite extensive efforts to increase 
completion rates, most patients do 
not complete an advance directive or 
otherwise document their treatment 
preferences.5 Moreover, completed 
advance directives often do not pro-
vide clear guidance for how the pa-
tient would want to be treated.6 As a 
result, current practice often fails to 
promote this goal.
Providing treatment consistent 
with the patient’s values and prefer-
ences. To provide treatment consis-
tent with the patient’s values and 
Commentators often focus on possible conflicts among the 
ethical goals for treatment decision-making, such as when 
a patient’s treatment preferences conflict with her clinical 
interests. But in current practice, it is often not clear how to 
realize any of these goals.
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preferences, current practice appeals 
to the patient’s advance directive. In 
the absence of a valid directive, surro-
gates are asked to select the treatment 
option they believe their loved one 
would have chosen if he or she were 
able to decide.7 Yet a review of the ex-
isting data, involving 19,526 paired 
patient-surrogate responses to hypo-
thetical treatment scenarios, found 
that patient-designated and next-of-
kin surrogates correctly predicted 
patients’ treatment choices only 68 
percent of the time. Since most of the 
scenarios offered binary choices, ran-
dom guessing would have been cor-
rect approximately 50 percent of the 
time. In addition, the treatment of-
fered in many of the scenarios clearly 
was in the patient’s clinical interests. 
These data suggest that surrogates’ 
predictions are only slightly better 
than chance in cases where it is un-
clear which treatment option would 
best promote the patient’s clinical 
interests.8 This finding has been con-
firmed by more recent studies.9
One might hope that surrogates 
are more accurate in actual circum-
stances, compared to the hypotheti-
cal scenarios used in the empirical 
studies. In particular, real cases pro-
vide essential details and convey the 
seriousness of treatment decisions, 
which might increase the accuracy of 
surrogates’ predictions. While this is 
a possibility, there is reason to believe 
that the stress and anxiety associated 
with making treatment decisions for 
incapacitated loved ones10 will de-
crease, rather than increase, surrogate 
accuracy.
In addition, empirical studies—in-
cluding a randomized, controlled trial 
of 408 patient-surrogate pairs11—find 
that the two most promising options 
for improving surrogate accuracy are 
ineffective. Neither appointing one’s 
own surrogate nor discussing one’s 
treatment preferences with the sur-
rogate improves the predictive accu-
racy of surrogate decision-makers.12 
One might also hope that surrogates 
could do better if they were coached 
on how to make treatment deci-
sions and, in particular, informed of 
common decisional biases, such as 
projecting one’s own treatment pref-
erences on to the patient. However, 
person-perception studies find that 
debiasing methods typically are not 
effective and can even reduce the ac-
curacy of some judgments.13 
At first glance, it seems surpris-
ing that surrogates poorly predict 
the treatment preferences of their 
loved ones, including those they 
have known intimately for decades. 
However, social psychology and con-
sumer behavior research suggests that 
surrogate inaccuracy is just one in-
stance of our more general inability 
to predict the preferences and values 
of our loved ones.14 For example, in 
one study, forty spouses predicted 
their partners’ preferences for twenty 
different consumer products no more 
accurately than predictions based 
on the preferences of the average 
spouse.15 Another study found that 
individuals who have been married a 
long time are less able to predict the 
views and feelings of their spouses 
than individuals married a relatively 
short time.16
Predicting a loved one’s preferenc-
es regarding consumer goods is very 
different from predicting his or her 
values and preferences about medical 
treatment. Peoples’ consumer prefer-
ences fluctuate significantly, and usu-
ally not much is at stake if we choose 
the wrong tie for dad’s birthday. By 
contrast, patients’ treatment prefer-
ences are more fundamental, and 
patients’ lives often are at stake when 
treatment decisions must be made for 
them. Recognizing these differences, 
the available data suggest that surro-
gates’ predictions for their loved one’s 
treatment preferences are no more ac-
curate than the predictions for their 
loved one’s consumer preferences. 
The reason is that the mechanisms 
undermining our predictive abilities 
trace largely to general facts about 
human psychology and human re-
lationships, not to the details of the 
decisions in question.17 These mecha-
nisms include:
• Difficulty processing informa-
tion: When trying to predict the 
preferences of those we know very 
well, it is difficult to sort through 
everything we know about them to 
identify the facts that are relevant 
to the choice in question.18
• Overconfidence: We tend to as-
sume that we know the preferences 
of family and loved ones19 and, 
therefore, we bypass the process of 
attempting to figure out what they 
would want in the circumstanc-
es.20 Overconfidence also makes it 
difficult to learn. When confident 
about a prediction, we tend to re-
interpret negative feedback as be-
ing consistent with our view, or we 
ignore it.21 
• Assumption of similarity: We 
assume that those closest to us 
share our values. This mechanism 
is important for maintaining inti-
mate relationships.22 However, it 
makes it difficult to separate what 
we want in a given situation from 
what we think a loved one would 
want.23 While the assumption of 
similarity can be appropriate in 
some cases, data reveal that surro-
gates’ treatment decisions are often 
guided by different values than the 
decisions of their loved ones.24
In addition to these fundamental 
psychological mechanisms, the clini-
cal context introduces factors that can 
further reduce surrogates’ predictive 
abilities. 
• Anxiety: Deciding whether to 
implement a medical treatment to 
keep a loved one alive often causes 
significant anxiety.25 For example, 
of 920 family members visiting 
patients in intensive care units in 
France, more than two-thirds were 
suffering from symptoms of anxi-
ety or depression.26
• Complexity: Predicting patients’ 
treatment preferences requires sur-
rogates to understand complex 
medical facts. Many people have 
September-October 2010 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT      39
difficulty reasoning about prob-
abilities,27 which undermines their 
ability to make decisions based on 
the patient’s medical prognosis.
• Discomfort with surrogate 
role: Trying to predict which 
treatment is consistent with the 
patient’s preferences can leave sur-
rogates feeling responsible for the 
outcome.28 Studies find that sur-
rogates often respond by choosing 
whichever treatment option mini-
mizes their sense of responsibility.29
Given that psychological mecha-
nisms are entrenched and these other 
factors are inherent to the clinical 
context, it seems unlikely that we will 
be able to improve surrogates’ abil-
ity to predict which treatments their 
loved one would want. In the absence 
of a valid advance directive, current 
practice therefore often will fail to 
treat patients in a way that is consis-
tent with their preferences and values.
Respecting the patient’s preferences 
for how treatment decisions are made. 
Empirical studies suggest that many 
patients want their family members to 
make treatment decisions for them.30 
A qualitative study of seventy-one el-
derly individuals found that 90 per-
cent wanted their family and loved 
ones to make treatment decisions for 
them if they became unable to do so.31 
In a study of eighty dialysis patients, 
most had not completed an advance 
directive because they thought family 
members should make decisions on 
their behalf.32 These studies suggest 
that current reliance on surrogates 
promotes respect for patients’ prefer-
ences regarding how treatment deci-
sions are made.33
The problem is that many of the 
patients who have been surveyed 
want their family members to make 
treatment decisions for them because 
the patients assume that their family 
members know their treatment pref-
erences.34 For example, most of the 
patients in one study wanted family 
members to decide on their behalf 
because they assumed that “their fam-
ily knew what they would want.”35 
There are no data on how patients 
would want treatment decisions to be 
made if they were informed about the 
inaccuracy of their surrogates’ pre-
dictions. Thus, it is unclear whether 
current practice promotes this ethical 
goal.
Respecting and helping the pa-
tient’s family and loved ones. A 
number of studies have assessed the 
impact on surrogates of making treat-
ment decisions at the end of life.36 
These studies consistently find that 
many surrogates experience anxiety, 
stress, depression, and family conflict 
as a result of making treatment deci-
sions. A minority of surrogates seem 
to be comforted by the fact that they 
played an important role in protect-
ing their loved ones.37
Anxiety over whether they made 
the right decision is profound in many 
surrogates and can last for months—
even years.38 One study of seventy-
four surrogates found that stress levels 
were “extraordinarily high” compared 
to the same stress measures in indi-
viduals who had experienced ferry 
or construction disasters, or loss of 
housing due to fire. The same study 
reports that, although stress levels had 
decreased at six months, they “still ex-
ceeded the levels in those other trau-
matic situations.”39
Some of the stress and anxiety ex-
perienced by surrogates is likely part 
of the grieving process, the stress of 
the intensive care unit, and the of-
ten-inadequate communication with 
clinicians and other hospital staff.40 
Yet a quantitative study found sig-
nificantly higher rates of stress and 
anxiety among twenty-two family 
members who were involved in mak-
ing end-of-life treatment decisions, 
compared to twenty-eight family 
members who were not involved in 
these decisions.41 Qualitative studies 
suggest poignant explanations for this 
effect.42 One surrogate reported that 
she would not wish the experience of 
making end-of-life treatment deci-
sions for a loved one on her “worst 
enemy.”43
Taken together, the existing data 
suggest that current practice fails to 
benefit and may well harm many 
patients’ families and loved ones. 
Because many patients do not want 
to be a burden on their family and 
loved ones,44 these findings raise 
further questions regarding whether 
informed patients—those who rec-
ognize the extent of surrogate inac-
curacy and surrogate burden—would 
want their family and loved ones to 
make treatment decisions for them. 
It may be, then, that current practice 
fails to respect patients’ true prefer-
ences for how treatment decisions are 
made.
One would hope that some of 
the stress and anxiety that surrogates 
experience as a result of helping to 
make medical treatment decisions 
can be alleviated. Ongoing efforts 
focus on improving clinicians’ com-
munication skills45 and their ability to 
provide emotional support,46 as well 
as emphasizing shared responsibil-
ity between clinicians and surrogates 
for the decision-making process and 
the final treatment decision.47 Several 
studies also show that surrogates often 
experience significantly less stress—
and some even benefit—when they 
believe that they selected the treat-
ment option the patient would have 
chosen.48 These data suggest that im-
proved communication and shared 
decision-making benefits surrogates 
in some—but not all—possible ways. 
To further support them, we need a 
way to help surrogates predict which 
choice the patient would have made.
The challenge is to identify an approach to treatment 
decision-making that retains current practice in cases where 
it works well but supplements it in cases where it fails.
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Promoting timely decision-mak-
ing. To our knowledge, there are 
no empirical studies on how long it 
takes surrogates to make treatment 
decisions. However, empirical studies 
show that conflict about treatment 
decisions is frequent, occurring in at 
least a third of all cases.49 Assuming 
that disagreement prolongs decision-
making, these data suggest that cur-
rent practice likely does not promote 
timely decisions.
The above analysis suggests that 
current practice works well when cli-
nicians know which treatment pro-
motes the patient’s clinical interests, 
and families do not have reason to 
believe that receiving that treatment 
is contrary to the patient’s prefer-
ences and values. Current practice 
works less well when it is not clear 
how to promote the patient’s clinical 
interests, and the patient’s treatment 
preferences are unclear or unknown. 
This analysis presents the challenge of 
identifying an approach to treatment 
decision-making that retains current 
practice in the cases where it works 
well, but supplements it in cases where 
it fails to promote the six ethical goals 
for treatment decision-making.
Alternative Approaches 
A number of modifications to current practice have been pro-
posed. The most widely endorsed 
is shared decision-making between 
clinicians and surrogates.50 As dis-
cussed, shared decision-making is 
likely to alleviate at least some of 
the stress and anxiety that surrogates 
experience, and patients may prefer 
shared decision-making over current 
practice for this reason. Yet shared de-
cision-making is unlikely to promote 
the goal of providing treatment that 
is consistent with the patient’s pref-
erences and values. In particular, em-
pirical studies find that physicians are 
even less accurate than surrogates at 
predicting patients’ treatment prefer-
ences.51 Presumably, combining two 
inaccurate decision-makers will not 
increase the chances that incapacitat-
ed patients receive the treatment they 
would want.
Some commentators endorse nar-
rative approaches to treatment deci-
sion-making,52 focusing on making 
treatment decisions that continue 
the patient’s life story. While this 
approach makes sense, continuing a 
patient’s life story largely would be 
realized by making decisions consis-
tent with the preferences and values 
that guided the individual’s life. As 
we have seen, this goal has been very 
difficult to promote.
Commentators have also proposed 
alternatives to current practice that 
would reduce the role of surrogates 
in the treatment decision-making 
process. For example, some suggest 
having treatment decisions made by 
physicians alone.53 This approach is 
likely to result in timely decisions, 
but it fails to promote the other 
ethical goals for treatment decision-
making. Physicians predict patients’ 
treatment preferences even less ac-
curately than surrogates,54 and most 
patients do not want treatment deci-
sions to be made solely by their clini-
cians. Moreover, excluding surrogates 
from the decision-making process 
fails to respect them and their impor-
tant standing in patients’ lives.
Other commentators suggest that 
treatment decisions should be made 
by ethics committees or judges.55 
Data suggest that strangers predict 
loved ones’ preferences more accu-
rately than family members or loved 
ones.56 These data provide some 
reason to think that courts or insti-
tutional ethics committees might 
better promote the goal of providing 
treatment consistent with patients’ 
preferences. However, courts and 
ethics committees require consid-
erable time to be convened and to 
familiarize themselves with a given 
case, thus undermining the goal of 
timely decision-making. Relying on 
courts and ethics committees would 
also distance patients’ families and 
loved ones from treatment decision-
making, which fails to respect most 
patients’ preferences regarding how 
treatment decisions are made. 
Finally, some commentators have 
endorsed basing treatment decisions 
for incapacitated patients on the 
preferences of patients in the same 
community.57 This approach could 
promote timely decision-making, 
assuming the requisite data are col-
lected ahead of time. Yet basing treat-
ment decisions on the preferences of 
other patients in the same commu-
nity is unlikely to identify the treat-
ment option most consistent with the 
patient’s preferences and values unless 
the community happens to be very 
homogenous, at least with respect 
to values and preferences regarding 
medical care. A community-based 
approach also removes patients’ sur-
rogates from the decision-making 
process, and thus is unlikely to re-
spect patients’ preferences for the 
decision-making process.
A Proposal for Supplementing 
Current Practice
Of the proposed alternative ap-proaches to current practice, 
decision-making that is shared be-
tween surrogates and clinicians seems 
to offer the greatest potential for 
supplementing and improving cur-
rent practice in cases where the pa-
tient’s clinical interests and treatment 
preferences are unclear. Shared deci-
sion-making allows surrogates to be 
involved in the care of their loved one 
and to protect their loved one from 
abuse while gaining the benefit of cli-
nicians’ medical expertise. Moreover, 
a sense of shared responsibility for the 
final treatment decision is likely to 
reduce surrogates’ stress and anxiety. 
These advantages should also increase 
the chances that clinicians will sup-
port shared decision-making. In ad-
dition, shared responsibility would 
probably relieve clinicians’ own tor-
ments. The collaborative spirit of 
shared decision-making might also 
allow clinicians to reduce misunder-
standing and conflict with surrogates. 
This should help to promote the pa-
tient’s clinical interests. 
Recognizing these advantages, 
shared decision-making fails to 
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address the problem that often nei-
ther surrogates nor clinicians know 
which treatments are consistent with 
the patient’s preferences and values. 
This problem can undermine three 
of the six ethical goals for treatment 
decision-making. Insufficient knowl-
edge of the patient’s treatment pref-
erences reduces the chance that the 
patient will be treated in a way con-
sistent with his or her preferences 
and values. It also leaves families still 
stressed about identifying their loved 
one’s preferred treatment option and 
likely delays treatment decisions. In 
light of these considerations, patients 
may well prefer some other approach 
to treatment decision-making. But 
to supplement current practice and 
further improve treatment decision-
making for incapacitated patients, 
we must consider how surrogates and 
clinicians can better predict which 
treatments are consistent with the pa-
tient’s preferences and values.
One possibility would be to pre-
dict which treatment the patient 
would have chosen based on his or 
her individual characteristics and fea-
tures of the treatment options. Data 
reveal that patients’ treatment prefer-
ences often correlate with their indi-
vidual characteristics, especially age,58 
gender,59 and race.60 The character-
istics of a given treatment option—
such as the burden it imposes on the 
patient61 and the patient’s expected 
state of health after treatment62—
also influence how people want to be 
treated during periods of decisional 
incapacity.
These data point to the possibil-
ity of predicting how a given inca-
pacitated patient would want to be 
treated based on his or her individual 
characteristics, the situation, and how 
these factors influence people’s treat-
ment preferences. To create a tool 
for predicting patient preferences, 
it would be necessary to gather ex-
tensive empirical data from a repre-
sentative sample on how individuals 
want to be treated in common situ-
ations involving decisional incapac-
ity. Statistical analysis of these data 
would identify predictors of patients’ 
treatment preferences that would be 
used to construct an algorithm to 
predict the treatment preferences of 
individual incapacitated patients. 
The resulting predictions could be in-
corporated into the shared decision-
making process in situations in which 
the patient’s treatment preferences 
are unknown, and which treatment 
would best promote the patient’s 
clinical interests is not clear. 
Advantages
Incorporating predictions of the individual patient’s treatment 
preferences has the potential to sig-
nificantly improve treatment deci-
sion-making. First, empirical data 
suggest that algorithmic predictions 
of patients’ treatment preferences are 
likely to be more accurate than sur-
rogates, thus promoting the goal of 
treating patients in a way consistent 
with their preferences and values. In 
one study, the average treatment pref-
erences of 401 individuals were as ac-
curate a predictor of any individual’s 
treatment preferences as the patient’s 
chosen surrogates.63 A second study 
found similar results when apply-
ing a common view about lifesaving 
treatment to almost fifty different 
treatment scenarios used in previous 
research about surrogate accuracy.64 
These data suggest that the treatment 
preferences of the average person 
can predict patients’ preferred treat-
ment just as accurately as surrogates. 
Therefore, it is likely that highly in-
dividualized predictions of patients’ 
treatment preferences will, on aver-
age, be more accurate than the pre-
dictions made by surrogates.
Second, incorporating predic-
tions about the patient’s treatment 
preferences into the shared decision-
making process has the potential to 
significantly reduce surrogates’ stress 
and anxiety. As discussed above, hav-
ing to guess which treatment is con-
sistent with the patient’s preferences 
and values is a significant cause of 
stress and anxiety for many surro-
gates. Using preference predictions 
could help surrogates to more accu-
rately identify their loved one’s pre-
ferred treatment option, alleviating 
this stress and anxiety and possibly 
reducing the extent to which surro-
gates feel personally responsible for 
the ultimate outcome.
Third, patients are likely to en-
dorse incorporating preference 
predictions into the shared decision-
making process if this reduces the 
stress and burden on their loved ones 
and increases the chances that they 
will receive treatment consistent with 
their preferences and values. If true, 
using preference predictions would 
also promote the goal of respecting 
patients’ preferences regarding how 
treatment decisions are made for 
them. 
Fourth and finally, knowing which 
treatments the patient is likely to 
want has the potential to help reduce 
conflict over treatment decisions. 
Predicting the patient’s treatment 
preferences may therefore signifi-
cantly aid timely treatment decisions. 
These advantages provide compelling 
reason to pursue future work to eval-
uate the acceptability and feasibility 
of using predictions of patients’ treat-
ment preferences in practice. 
Data point to the possibility of predicting how a given 
incapacitated patient would want to be treated based on 
her individual characteristics like age, gender, and race, her 
situation, and how these factors tend to influence treatment 
preferences.
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Open Questions
Before advocating for this ap-proach, it is important to clarify 
several essential conceptual and nor-
mative issues. First, individuals’ pref-
erences regarding medical treatment 
change over time. In order to develop 
an algorithm for predicting patients’ 
treatment preferences, we must de-
cide which stage of life should form 
the basis for identifying the prefer-
ences and values that guide treatment 
decisions for incapacitated patients. 
A plausible assumption is that the 
patients’ last competent preferences 
are the relevant ones. This approach 
is consistent with the current prac-
tice of basing decisions on the pref-
erences the patient last articulated or 
recorded.
Second, more research on pre-
cisely how predictions of the patient’s 
treatment preferences should be in-
corporated into the shared decision-
making process is also necessary. 
Should patients be able to mandate 
that their surrogates do not receive 
preference predictions? Should the 
preference predictions be provided to 
surrogates only when they ask for this 
information, or routinely to all surro-
gates? Or should their use be regarded 
as the default option, to be followed 
unless the surrogate objects?
Third, future research will also 
have to examine concerns about ste-
reotyping and abuse. Would pref-
erence predictions help to respect 
patients’ individual characteristics, 
or would they be seen as stereotyp-
ing patients? What are the chances 
that patients’ families or clinicians 
could abuse preference predictions—
for example, by using them to justify 
decisions that promote their own in-
terests over the patient’s? What are ef-
fective ways to address the potential 
for abuse?
In addition, extensive empiri-
cal work will be needed to develop 
a sound instrument for surveying 
people’s preferences for treatment 
during periods of decisional incapac-
ity. What is the best way to survey 
treatment preferences, and how can a 
predictive algorithm be isolated from 
these data? How accurately can an in-
strument predict patients’ treatment 
preferences? Further work will also 
be necessary to assess the impact of 
incorporating predictions of patients’ 
treatment preferences into the shared 
decision-making process between 
surrogates and clinicians. Does in-
corporating preference predictions 
reduce the stress and anxiety many 
surrogates experience from helping 
to make treatment decisions? What 
do patients think about different 
ways of using this kind of informa-
tion? Provided that using preference 
predictions can be defended on con-
ceptual and normative grounds, these 
questions would best be answered in 
a pilot study.
Among the existing proposals to 
improve treatment decision-making 
for incapacitated patients, incorpo-
rating predictions of the patient’s 
treatment preferences into the shared 
decision-making process between 
surrogates and clinicians appears to 
have the greatest potential to supple-
ment current practice and further 
promote the ethical goals for treat-
ment decision-making. Future re-
search will have to determine whether 
this approach is justifiable, whether it 
more often leads to treatment choices 
that are consistent with the patient’s 
preferences and values, what impact 
it has on surrogates, and whether sur-
rogates and patients endorse it as a 
supplement to current practice.
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